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331 
ULYSSES S. GRANT AND THE LOST 
OPPORTUNITY FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 
GRANT. By Ron Chernow.1 New York: Penguin Press. 2017. 
Pp. xvii + 1074. $40.00. 
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. 2 
Every law student, legal academic, and attorney would 
benefit from reading Ron Chernow’s exhaustive biography of 
Ulysses S. Grant. At first glance, that recommendation sounds 
counterintuitive, because Grant was not a lawyer—much less one 
like Alexander Hamilton (the subject of Chernow’s most 
celebrated study)3 who articulated and applied influential ideas 
about the role of law in shaping political, economic, and social 
forces.4 Nor was Grant a distinguished intellectual like Woodrow 
Wilson, whose novel vision of the Constitution reshaped America 
in ways that reverberate to this day.5 Rather, Grant was a failed 
 
 1. Writer, New York. Awarded 2011 Pulitzer Prize (Biography) for WASHINGTON: 
A LIFE (2010). 
 2. James Wilson Endowed Professor, Pepperdine University School of Law. J.D. 
Yale, 1988. 
 3. RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON (2005). This bestseller has, of course, 
achieved immense popular fame as the basis for the Broadway musical, Hamilton! 
 4. As a leader in the Constitution’s framing and ratification debates and as 
America’s first Secretary of the Treasury, Hamilton advocated a strongly nationalistic 
vision of federal government authority that ultimately prevailed in the twentieth century. 
See, e.g., Butler v. United States, 297 U.S. 1, 65–67, 77 (1936) (adopting Hamilton’s broad 
interpretation of Congress’s Article I power to tax and spend for the “general welfare” as 
including anything in the national interest, and rejecting Madison’s view that “general 
welfare” was limited to furthering the other seventeen enumerated powers). See also 
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Paradox of the Obamacare Decision: How Can The Federal 
Government Have Limited Unlimited Power?, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1993, 2033–41 (2013) 
(analyzing the triumph of the Hamiltonian position). Other attorneys who have had 
Hamiltonian impact and have been studied intensively include John Adams, Thomas 
Jefferson, James Madison, John Marshall, James Wilson, Joseph Story, Abraham Lincoln, 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Benjamin Cardozo, and Earl Warren. 
 5. As a Princeton professor and president, Wilson championed the Progressive 
theory that the Constitution, with its cumbersome “model of a decentralized government 
based on popular sovereignty, separation of powers, and federalism was inadequate to run 
a government of increasingly national scope.” See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and 
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businessman, a ruthlessly effective but not especially brilliant 
general, and a mediocre President.6 
Chernow attempts to rehabilitate Grant’s military and 
political reputation. He does so primarily by highlighting Grant’s 
one indispensable contribution to American law and government: 
spearheading the implementation of Abraham Lincoln’s 
Emancipation Proclamation and the various constitutional 
amendments and statutes that sought to guarantee former slaves 
not merely their liberty but also their civil and political rights. 
As Chernow details, nothing in Grant’s background 
suggested that he would play this leading role. Grant was 
ambivalent about slavery—opposed to it in theory, yet fearful 
(with good reason) that abolition would lead to bloody sectional 
strife (pp. 68, 99-108, 118-121). Moreover, he married Julia Dent, 
whose father was a wealthy Missouri slaveowner who disliked 
Grant and became an unrepentant Confederate sympathizer both 
during and after the Civil War (pp. 31-40, 93-106, 119-120, 125-
128, 133-134, 185, 451, 548, 601-602, 639, 768). Nonetheless, 
Grant’s experience during that war gradually brought about a 
profound change in his views on race (pp. 132, 228-229, 242-243, 
280-285, 440-441, 874-875). Grant’s transformation reflects the 
evolution of the very aims of the Civil War, which began as a fight 
 
Separation of Powers, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 455 (1996) (citing WOODROW WILSON, 
CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT (1885) and WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1907)). Instead, Wilson urged America to 
emulate England’s democratic system, in which the legislature (Parliament) and executive 
(the Prime Minister) from the majority political party work in concert and possess plenary 
power, thereby ensuring a government that could act decisively and responsibly in 
formulating a unified program administered by impartial experts. See id. at 455–56. 
Wilson’s ideas were fully realized in the 1930s when President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
cooperated with his large Democratic Party majority in Congress to adopt the New Deal, 
which ushered in the huge modern administrative state. See id. at 456–57. 
  It is also worth noting that Wilson was a thoroughgoing racist who believed in the 
inferiority of African Americans and, accordingly, took concrete steps to reverse their 
gains that had been hard earned during the Civil War (1861-1865) and Reconstruction 
(1865-1877). Put differently, Wilson helped destroy the racial advances that Grant and 
Abraham Lincoln had achieved. 
 6. See, e.g., WILLIAM S. MCFEELY, GRANT: A BIOGRAPHY (1981) (setting forth this 
standard view of Grant). Chernow acknowledges that Grant had terrible business skills 
and made many mistakes as President, but contends that he was a superb military strategist 
and tactician and that he steadfastly worked as both a general and President to ensure 
racial equality and justice (pp. xx–xxiii). Chernow thereby follows other revisionist 
biographers who have cast Grant’s service in a more favorable light. See, e.g., JEAN 
EDWARD SMITH, GRANT (2001) (maintaining that Grant was a great general and good 
President, with a particularly distinguished record in helping black Americans). 
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to save the Union but eventually added the goal of ending slavery 
(pp. 242-243, 440-441, 874-875). 
Chernow explains how Grant worked with Lincoln to achieve 
both objectives, as the unassuming West Point graduate—who 
had quit the Army in 1854 largely because of drinking problems 
(pp. 84-87)7– improbably rose from heading a small Illinois 
regiment in 1861 to commanding the entire Union Army a few 
years later (pp. 123-518). Chernow debunks the notion, 
popularized by Grant’s contemporaneous detractors (including 
Lincoln’s wife Mary) and many later historians (often Southern 
defenders of the Confederacy), that Grant was a “butcher” who 
ultimately won only because he acted on his cold-blooded 
calculation that the North, with its overwhelming advantages in 
manpower and resources, would eventually win a war of attrition 
(pp. xxi, 207-211, 266-267, 288-290, 295, 325-326, 344, 353-356, 
367-370, 395, 405-409, 421, 424, 426, 431, 433, 436, 439, 497, 452, 
464, 467, 469, 477, 481, 497, 516-518, 554, 578-579, 839, 866).8 
Rather, Chernow argues that Grant was a master grand strategist 
whose experiences as a general throughout the Midwest and 
South gave him an overall perspective that the Virginia-centric 
Robert E. Lee lacked (pp. xxi, 152, 226-227, 231, 294, 313, 343-
344, 348, 355-356, 369-370, 372-376, 396-397, 410-411, 417-418, 
443, 447, 457, 459, 462, 472-474, 487-490, 517-518, 671, 958). 
Similarly, Chernow portrays Grant as an excellent tactician who 
could improvise in battle and determine the psychological state of 
the enemy’s leaders and troops, which proved invaluable in 
knowing when to pursue them relentlessly after the first day of 
hostilities had ended in a draw—or even a seeming defeat (pp. xxi, 
152, 160, 179-181, 187-188, 193, 203-207, 214, 216, 224, 294, 316-
317, 324-325, 380-384, 389-406). 
Chernow further contends that, contrary to the “butcher” 
myth, Grant always had genuine concern for the well-being of his 
troops (pp. xxi, 264-270, 278, 280-285, 325-326, 373, 429). For 
 
 7. Chernow maintains that Grant’s admitted misuse of alcohol never interfered with 
his military performance or other duties and that he would often go months without 
drinking, but laments that Grant’s enemies never hesitated to label him a drunkard (pp. 
xx–xxiii, 58, 67, 69–70, 72–73, 80, 84–87, 97, 117–18, 130, 139–40, 149–50, 164–68, 186–87, 
189, 193, 209–10, 217, 219, 225, 237–38, 244, 250–52, 272–73, 282, 293, 300–03, 318–19, 336–
37, 350, 368, 415, 422–23, 428, 435, 449, 464, 466, 546, 582, 599, 606, 608–09, 619, 649, 749, 
863, 875, 878, 883–84, 888, 892–93, 959). 
 8. To be clear, Grant surely knew that continuous hard fighting would eventually 
grind down the South, but he did not shed blood heedlessly. 
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example, Grant drew on his experience as a quartermaster in the 
Mexican War and other conflicts to ensure that his men had 
adequate food, clothing, shelter, and weapons—an especially 
difficult task when he had to stretch his supply lines deep into 
Confederate territory to capture Southern strongholds in 
Mississippi and Tennessee (pp. 46-47, 57, 65, 73, 76-77, 131, 195-
288, 313-316, 330-331, 375, 408, 417-418). Moreover, although 
Grant could compartmentalize by shutting down his feelings 
during the carnage of battle—a trait shared by all successful 
generals and soldiers—afterwards he experienced considerable 
emotional pain upon witnessing the death, injuries, and 
destruction wrought, and he sought to alleviate the suffering (pp. 
xxi, 73-74, 158-160, 184, 200-207, 215-216, 246, 264-270, 278, 290, 
314-315, 331, 446). Grant’s empathy and compassion extended to 
Southern soldiers, officers, and citizens, who were always treated 
humanely (pp. xxi, 48-49, 174, 181-184, 221-222, 288-291, 298, 325-
326, 399, 464-468, 475, 485, 495, 508-511, 575, 533, 536, 548-554, 
565, 590, 746-747, 951). 
Most importantly for present purposes, Chernow documents 
Grant’s insistence that “Negroes” (as they were then called) be 
allowed—indeed, encouraged—to serve in the military, often in 
the face of vehement opposition from other officers, soldiers, and 
politicians (pp. xxii, 142, 184, 222-223, 243-244, 247, 280-285, 293, 
298-299, 303-304, 332, 352, 373, 398, 415-416, 428-430, 441, 450-
451, 475-476, 495, 530). Admittedly, Grant’s policy reflected 
military considerations as well as morality, since he realized that 
adding over 100,000 ex-slaves would increase the Union’s already 
huge advantage in manpower (pp. 228, 243, 280-284, 298-299, 332, 
450). Nonetheless, Chernow shows that Grant was genuinely 
impressed by the skill and bravery of African American troops, 
who were often subjected to unspeakable savagery when captured 
(pp. 280-284, 293, 298-299, 332, 373, 398, 429-430). 
Chernow further maintains that Grant viscerally understood 
that this military service would eventually prove to be blacks’ 
strongest argument for freedom and legal equality, particularly if 
the political and legal rights of white Southern traitors were 
restored (pp. 228-230, 244, 282-285, 293, 298-299, 352, 441, 467-
468, 473, 475-476, 530, 561, 564-565, 584-585).9 Grant also grasped 
 
 9. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 396 (2005) 
(“The story of black ballots begins with black bullets. At war’s end, it started to sink in that 
blacks in blue [uniforms] had helped save the Union.”). 
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fairly quickly that, even though the Emancipation Proclamation 
of January 1, 1863, covered only those states (or portions thereof) 
in rebellion, Lincoln had unleashed forces that would culminate 
in freeing slaves everywhere, even in border states that had stayed 
in the Union (Delaware, Maryland, Missouri, and Kentucky) (pp. 
xxii, 228, 242-244, 280-285, 293, 467-468, 494, 518, 548, 564-565, 
644, 685, 744, 851).10 
Chernow rightfully lauds Grant for his singular leadership in 
carrying out Lincoln’s vision of capitalizing on the war to promote 
racial freedom and equality. However, Chernow goes a bit 
overboard in singing Grant’s praises and, correspondingly, cutting 
Lee down to size (pp. 294-295, 349-350, 366-369, 392, 431-437, 447, 
517, 554, 839). Lee’s superiority as a general was apparent to 
everyone—including Lincoln, who offered him command of the 
United States Army at the war’s outset and watched in despair as 
Lee repeatedly defeated a series of Union generals before Grant 
took overall command in early 1864 (pp. 123-124, 219, 227-231, 
368).11 Had Lee accepted Lincoln’s invitation, there is little doubt 
he would have won the war, likely a lot faster. But one thing the 
slaveholding Lee never would have done is work to ensure liberty 
and justice for African Americans, as Grant did. 
Perhaps most significantly, Grant ardently supported the 
Thirteenth Amendment abolishing slavery and involuntary 
servitude, which Congress proposed a few months before 
Lincoln’s assassination in April 1865, and which was ratified 
shortly thereafter (pp. xxii, 467-468, 564-565, 644, 685, 744, 856). 
Lincoln’s death left Grant as the only American with the national 
stature to lead the effort to translate the military victory into 
law—federal statutes and constitutional amendments designed to 
help African Americans (pp. 526-907).12 Although he had already 
worked with Lincoln and other Republicans to achieve such racial 
 
 10. Of course, the progression from the Emancipation Proclamation to the 
Thirteenth Amendment was not inevitable. Indeed, at the time of the Proclamation, 
Lincoln himself proposed a plan to provide federal compensation for freed slaves to 
masters who had remained loyal to the Union (including in the border states), not to 
abolish slavery outright. See AMAR, supra note 9, at 357–58. 
 11. See EMORY THOMAS, ROBERT E. LEE: A BIOGRAPHY 14–20, 187–316, 414–17 
(1997). 
 12. See AMAR, supra note 9, at 119 (“[I]t is largely thanks to U.S. Grant’s central 
army that the Reconstruction Amendments were fairly adopted in a process that included 
Southern Unionists and Southern blacks.”). Professor Amar provides an especially 
insightful distillation of how the Civil War and Reconstruction led to a “new birth of 
freedom” for African Americans. Id. at 351–401. 
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gains, Grant had voted for the Democrat James Buchanan in 
1856, and his political affiliation remained mysterious (pp. 99-100, 
107, 511, 513, 518, 548-549, 580-581, 591, 597). 
Initially, Grant tried to remain neutral between the 
Republican-dominated Congress and new President Andrew 
Johnson, a Tennessee Democrat (pp. 531-538, 548-550, 562, 565-
566, 572-577, 579-582, 586, 591, 594-595, 605, 607-608).  Johnson 
had remained loyal to the United States and had been chosen as 
Lincoln’s running mate in November 1864 to beef up pro-Union 
sentiment among “War Democrats” and in the border states (pp. 
284, 409, 531-532). Although Johnson did not believe that the 
Constitution allowed Southern states to secede, he also did not 
think that it authorized the Republican Congress’s 
Reconstruction agenda—particularly giving blacks (whom he 
considered inferior) civil and political rights (pp. 531-533, 548-550, 
562, 565-614). Accordingly, Johnson repeatedly vetoed 
Reconstruction bills designed to nullify Southern states’ 
oppressive Black Codes and their encouragement of race-based 
violence and, after Congress overrode him, refused to properly 
execute those laws (pp. 562-563, 569-571, 573, 576, 579, 583-598, 
600, 609-610, 613). Johnson also assailed—and delayed adoption 
of—Congress’s proposed Fourteenth Amendment, which 
prohibited States from (1) abridging the “privileges or 
immunities” (i.e., basic civil rights) of all “citizens,” including 
former slaves; (2) depriving any “person” of “life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law;” or (3) denying “any person 
. . . the equal protection of the laws” (pp. 573, 583-585).13 
Grant was in a delicate situation because he could not 
publicly criticize Johnson, his Commander-in-Chief (pp. 549, 551-
553, 569, 571, 576-577, 579-580, 586, 589, 594, 597, 610). 
Nevertheless, Grant privately and through his surrogates 
supported the efforts of Republicans in Congress to ensure racial 
equality and justice, especially through the Reconstruction Acts 
of 1867 (pp. xxii-xxiii, 506-507, 561-566, 572, 575-577, 580-606, 611, 
613-614, 856). Furthermore, it became known that Grant favored 
Johnson’s impeachment, which narrowly failed in May 1868 (pp. 
609-612).14 By then, Grant’s identification with the Republican 
 
 13. Congress proposed the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866, but Johnson’s 
opposition helped delay ratification until July 1868 (pp. 573, 614). 
 14. An illuminating in-depth study is MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, THE IMPEACHMENT 
AND TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON (1973). Although I agree with Professor Benedict that 
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Party had been clearly revealed, and a few months later he 
became its Presidential candidate (pp. 605-616). 
After his election in November 1868 and reelection four 
years later, Grant faithfully carried out the letter and spirit of the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as anti-
discrimination legislation (pp. 627, 635, 654-656, 685, 700-701, 733-
734, 744-745, 748-749, 755, 759-760, 782-786, 790-795, 827, 839, 
842, 850-851, 856-858, 895-896). He also led the fight for the 
Fifteenth Amendment prohibiting racial discrimination in voting, 
which was ratified in February 1870 (pp. xxii-xiii, 632, 655-656, 
685-687, 744-746, 760-763).15 Grant vigorously enforced this 
Amendment—including by military intervention in Southern 
states that violently opposed black suffrage—until 1875 (pp. 685-
687, 700-707, 744-746, 760-763, 784, 786, 791-794, 839, 851, 856-
857, 957).16 Moreover, to give the Reconstruction Amendments 
practical force, Grant successfully made destroying the Ku Klux 
Klan a top priority (pp. xxii-xxiii, 588-589, 613, 621, 655, 662, 686, 
701-712, 745-746, 785-786, 794, 856-857, 957). Furthermore, he 
was the first President to welcome African Americans to the 
White House and to appoint them in large numbers to federal 
positions, including diplomatic posts (pp. 641-642, 684, 744, 746, 
749, 855-856). Finally, Grant helped freed slaves in other areas, 
particularly education (pp. 656, 690, 748-749, 812, 894-895).17 
 
Johnson was a nasty guy who should have implemented Reconstruction, I disagree with 
Benedict’s conclusion that the President should have been impeached. Id. at 26–183. 
Johnson had not committed any “high crimes or misdemeanors,” as his bitter political 
disagreement with the Republican Congress did not amount to treason or corruption. 
Furthermore, a key impeachment charge was that Johnson had violated an Act of 
Congress prohibiting him from removing Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, but Johnson 
correctly believed that Article II empowered him to remove Cabinet officials at will (pp. 
609–11). The classic statement of the President’s discretion to remove his executive branch 
subordinates is Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 63–64 (1926). 
 15. This effort is not surprising, as Grant had championed black suffrage since the 
end of the Civil War (pp. 511, 513, 549, 553–54, 568–69, 585, 590, 592, 600–01, 610, 621, 
623). 
 16. Grant finally began to waver in late 1875 because of intense pressure from 
Northern Republicans (pp. 710, 744–45, 784–87, 792–93, 813–18). 
 17. Grant focused on ensuring blacks’ civil rights (including physical security), 
political equality, and educational opportunities—but not on their economic development. 
In March 1865, Lincoln had supported creation of the Freedmen’s Bureau, which provided 
ex-slaves not only with food, clothing, shelter, and education, but also with large plots of 
land that had been confiscated from rebel soldiers (pp. 475, 562). Shortly after taking 
office, President Johnson reversed that land redistribution policy (pp. 562–63). In a 
December 1865 report, Grant backed Johnson’s position (p. 565). 
  Chernow claims that Grant quickly regretted his report (p. 566). If so, however, 
it is not clear why Grant, when he became President in 1869, failed to reinvigorate 
4 - PUSHAW.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/21/18 1:51 PM 
338 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 33:331 
 
Grant’s steadfast commitment to racial progress was obvious 
to his contemporaries. Most notably, Frederick Douglass 
repeatedly recognized Grant’s unmatched contributions in 
protecting and assisting black Americans (pp. xxii, 230, 642, 706, 
709, 714-715, 718-719, 746, 858). 
Unfortunately, this achievement was one of the few bright 
spots in Grant’s presidency. Although he had unquestioned 
personal integrity, Grant naively entrusted men who lacked this 
quality with high-level government positions, resulting in scandals 
and incompetence that plagued his administration.18 Therefore, 
Chernow does not, and really cannot, restore Grant’s tarnished 
reputation as President outside the sphere of race relations.19 
The great tragedy for Grant, and America, is that his heroic 
efforts to ensure racial freedom, equality, and justice swiftly came 
to naught. Indeed, during Grant’s second term (1873-1877), in the 
face of implacable Southern hostility, Northern Republicans 
increasingly grew tired of Reconstruction—particularly Grant’s 
repeated use of military force to vindicate black voting rights, a 
policy he finally halted in late 1875 (pp. 710, 744-745, 784-787, 792-
793, 813-818). 
 
Lincoln’s scheme—and thereby condemned most former slaves to a life of indentured 
servitude. Chernow ultimately asserts that “extensive land reform . . . [was] a fine idea, but 
perhaps quixotic in a region dominated by the Klan and other terrorist groups” (p. 857). 
Yet Grant effectively destroyed the Klan, and so presumably could have prevented it from 
foiling land redistribution to the former slaves. 
 18. These problems began immediately when Grant, a political neophyte, personally 
selected his Cabinet without any vetting or consultation with Congress or other 
experienced advisors (pp. 624–29, 634–36). His appointments to government positions 
great and small often reflected cronyism and nepotism (pp. 636–41). Predictably, 
incompetence and scandals proliferated. Chernow acknowledges these problems, but 
maintains that Grant succeeded in other areas—not merely racial justice, but also foreign 
affairs and economic policy (pp. 690–857). 
 19. Moreover, he airbrushes Grant’s virulent antipathy towards non-Protestants. For 
example, although Chernow does mention Grant’s infamous order banning Jews from 
trading in his military district in 1863, he asserts that Grant later deeply regretted it, 
apologized, appointed many Jews to positions in his administration, and always reached 
out to them (pp. 233–36, 620, 642–44, 836–37, 956). But Grant's order reflected his anti-
Semitism. SMITH, supra note 6, at 225–27. Similarly, Chernow accepts at face value Grant’s 
claim in an 1875 speech that he was merely promoting church-state separation by 
supporting free public education and decrying government assistance to religious schools 
(pp. 811–12). In fact, Grant’s rhetoric disguised his anti-Catholic bias, as manifested in his 
support for the federal and state constitutional “Blaine Amendments” that prohibited 
government aid to sectarian educational institutions, which targeted Catholic schools 
serving large urban immigrant communities. See Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment 
Reconsidered, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 38, 41–43, 47–57, 67–69 (1992). 
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This weariness culminated in the “Compromise of 1877”: 
Republicans agreed to remove federal troops from the South and 
end Reconstruction, and in return Democrats awarded all 
nineteen disputed Electoral College votes (in South Carolina, 
Florida, and Louisiana) to Republican presidential candidate 
Rutherford B. Hayes (giving him a one-vote margin over his 
Democratic rival Samuel Tilden, the popular-vote winner) (pp. 
828, 838, 843-850, 890-891). 
White racist Democrats quickly took control of all Southern 
state governments, enforced draconian “Jim Crow” segregation 
laws, allowed a revived KKK to thrive, and destroyed blacks’ 
political rights through subterfuges like poll taxes and literacy 
tests—all of which plunged America into a racist abyss (pp. 817-
818, 840-841, 853-858). In fact, it was not until Brown v. Board of 
Education20 in 1954, followed by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, that the legal promises of the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were fulfilled (pp. 795, 
858).21 
Of course, announcing equality under law did not magically 
result in a level playing field in politics, society, economic matters, 
or education. Indeed, the continuing struggles of African 
Americans in all those areas are a reminder of the legacy of 
slavery and legalized race discrimination. Thus, Chernow’s 
history helps illuminate modern debates over a spectrum of racial 
issues. 
Most obviously, two recent events have focused the national 
spotlight on the treatment of Confederate symbols and 
monuments. First, after a racist massacred black congregants at a 
church in Charleston, South Carolina in 2015, then-Governor 
Nikki Haley successfully demanded removal of the Confederate 
flag—which she called “a deeply offensive symbol of a brutally 
 
 20. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 21. For complex legal and political reasons, Congress formally enacted the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 as an exercise of its Article I power to regulate interstate commerce, 
not its Fourteenth Amendment power to guarantee racial equality. See Grant S. Nelson & 
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First Principles to 
Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control Over Social Issues, 85 
IOWA L. REV. 1, 86, 124–25 (1999). Nonetheless, Congress’s true goal was to eliminate the 
moral evil of race discrimination—the vital purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 
125. 
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offensive past”—from the State House.22 Second, in 2017 white 
nationalists protesting Charlottesville’s proposed removal of its 
Robert E. Lee statue sparked a riot that turned deadly.23 
Such high-profile incidents, however, are merely the tip of 
the iceberg. For example, profound legal and political questions 
have been raised about the actual effectiveness of the modern 
welfare state in helping black Americans; the constitutionality 
and practical viability of race-based affirmative action programs; 
and policing in predominantly black neighborhoods. Reasonable 
people can disagree on the appropriate responses, but such 
opinions should be informed by studies like Chernow’s. 24 
Ultimately, his magisterial and crisply written biography 
leaves us to ponder what would have happened if Grant’s legal 
advances in race relations had taken root immediately instead of 
 
 22. Frances Robles, Richard Fausset & Michael Barbaro, Nikki Haley, South 
Carolina Governor, Calls for Removal of Confederate Battle Flag, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 
2015, at A1. 
 23. Jacey Fortin, The Statue at the Center of Charlottesville’s Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
13, 2017, at B1. 
 24. For example, proponents of preferential treatment for African Americans, 
Latinos, and Native Americans (particularly in state universities) argue that such 
affirmative action is both constitutionally permissible and socially necessary, for two 
reasons. The first is to remedy the present lingering effects of past de jure discrimination. 
See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298–305 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The second 
is to achieve the educational benefits of diversity by considering race or ethnicity as a 
“plus” factor as part of an individualized assessment of each candidate. See, e.g., Grutter 
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 311–44 (2003). Opponents have responded that (1) the Equal 
Protection Clause forbids all race discrimination, including against whites; (2) states do not 
have a compelling interest in achieving “diversity;” (3) program beneficiaries tend to be 
well-off blacks, Latinos, and Native Americans; (4) minority students who do not meet a 
school’s ordinary academic admissions standards cannot effectively compete with their 
classmates who do; and (5) minority students who meet those standards are stigmatized as 
undeserving. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349–78 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See generally 
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Partial-Birth Abortion and the Perils of Constitutional Common 
Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 519, 582–84 (2008) (discussing these competing 
rationales and contending that the Court’s decisions in Gratz and Grutter are incoherent 
as a matter of constitutional law). 
  Chernow’s study might be cited to support Justice Ginsburg’s view that 
affirmative action is needed to address the legacy of slavery and legal discrimination from 
1865 to 1965. But his book might also be invoked to defend two more limited positions. 
First, perhaps these programs should focus on helping descendants of former slaves who 
are currently experiencing socioeconomic disadvantages. Second, even more narrowly, 
perhaps governments should follow the advice of Frederick Douglass (whom Chernow 
identifies as Grant’s most influential black supporter) and “do nothing” for or against 
African Americans. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349–50, 378 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Douglass). 
  Fully engaging the foregoing debate would, of course, require a lengthy analysis. 
My modest point is that Chernow’s work can usefully shed light on these issues. 
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being delayed for nearly a century.25 As with all counterfactuals, 
we can never know. But we can safely speculate that America 
today would be in much better shape. 
 
25. Chernow acknowledges other scholars who have tried to restore Grant’s 
reputation:  
[T]he appraisal of Grant’s presidency rests upon posterity’s view of 
Reconstruction. . . . For a long time after the Civil War, under the influence of 
Southern historians, Reconstruction was viewed as a catastrophic error, a period 
of corrupt carpetbag politicians and illiterate black legislators, presided over by 
the draconian rule of U.S. Grant. For more recent historians, led by Eric Foner, 
it has been seen as a noble experiment in equal justice for black citizens in which 
they made remarkable strides in voting, holding office, owning land, creating 
small businesses and churches, and achieving literacy. . . . Since Grant was 
president during this period, his standing was bound to rise with this revisionist 
view (p. 856). 
  Professor Foner’s pathbreaking work portrays the newly freed slaves as 
important and active participants in Reconstruction, who ultimately could not consolidate 
their gains because the federal government stopped supporting them. ERIC FONER, 
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 (updated ed. 
2014). He recognizes that Grant helped Lincoln and Congress in implementing the 
Emancipation Proclamation and employing black troops, and that Grant’s 1868 election 
guaranteed that Reconstruction would continue. Id. at 337–38, 344, 383, 412, 444. 
However, Foner criticizes Grant for rejecting the Radical Republicans’ ideological vision 
of full equality for blacks—including in the economic and social spheres—in favor of a 
more moderate approach focused on formal legal and political equality. Id. at 344, 445–47, 
485, 496, 524–63. 
 
